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McMULLIN, Irene.  Time and the Shared World:  Heidegger on Social 
Relations.  Evanston:  Northwestern University Press, 2013.  xiii + 298pp.  
Cloth, $99.95.  Paper, $34.95—A common and widely shared criticism of 
Heidegger’s account of the human, even by those who are sympathetic and 
largely approving of his account, finds it inadequate with regard to social 
relations.  The criticism takes various shapes—that Heidegger’s view of 
Dasein is solipsistic, that his account makes sense of the “we” but fails to 
account for the “I-Thou (you), that relations to others are inevitably 
inauthentic, that the individuality of the other is lost in the anonymity of an a 
priori category, and so on.  Irene McMullin ably defends Heidegger’s 
account both by directly addressing the criticisms and by providing a 
detailed and nuanced reading of “Heidegger on social relations.” 
 This work relies almost entirely on the so-called early Heidegger, the 
Heidegger of Being and Time.  Her account usefully draws also on Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, The Essence of Human Freedom, The History 
of the Concept of Time and a few other early works.   From the later works 
The Zollikon Seminars are important for her interpretation.  McMullin reads 
Heidegger as a transcendental phenomenologist who is deeply indebted to  
Husserl and also to Kant.  She asserts that Heidegger was not as narrowly 
focused on the human theoretical capacity as were Husserl and Kant, but she 
also asserts that “Heidegger is a phenomenologist in the same scientific way 
Husserl was.”  She thinks that the difference between the early and the later 
Heidegger is often overstated, though this claim is not developed or 
important to the book (other than the usage of The Zollikon Seminars to 
occasionally illuminate her interpretation).   One can see how her approach 
to Heidegger relies on the work of Steven Crowell, though her account of 
sociality and intersubjectivity in Heidegger, goes beyond what he has done 
in this regard. 
 At the very beginning of the book she acknowledges that Heidegger 
failed to fully develop his position and adds that she will not speculate on 
why this is so.  She also acknowledges more than once that Heidegger can 
be found to be inconsistent in his treatment of this phenomenon.  She 
develops explicitly what she takes to be implicit in Heidegger’s account.   
Her interpretation is advanced by way of dealing with the major criticisms of 
Heidegger in this regard.  She takes on Dreyfus, Searle, Sartre, Levinas, 
Nancy, Theunissen, Blattner, among others.   Of these, the most important 
are Sartre and Levinas.  McMullin wishes to show that Levinas’ account of 
the relation to the other is not as different from Heidegger’s account as 
Levinas would have us see.   At the heart of McMullin’s account of the 
sociality of Dasein is the temporality of Dasein.  She does not rely merely 
on sketchy account of “being-with” (Mitsein) that Heidegger provides but 
shows how our being-with-another pervades and is relevant to the other 
basic structures of Dasein, especially discourse and conscience but most 
importantly time and temporality.  The book is more ambitious than merely 
to show how ‘social’ the human is.  It also attempts to show how 
Heidegger’s account provides an understanding of the origins of normativity 
and the basis for respect, that is, an ethics.  
 The work begins with a discussion of “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit) in 
which she attempts to find a middle way between Dreyfus and Searle with 
regard to self-awareness—a way less propositional than Searle and more 
normative than Dreyfus.  The argument then moves on to consider the 
criticisms of Sartre, Levinas, and Theunissen.  She argues that in the 
encounter with things and persons in the world “the order of precedence 
prioritizes the inaugural encounter with concrete foreign temporalities.”  She 
rejects the view that there is a priority in Heidegger’s account to the 
encounter with things.  What the other brings to one is another view of the 
world and another temporality.  According to McMullin, injustice is for 
Heidegger the insistence on “my time… my now.”  She shows how one can 
be a conscience for others.  She argues that the everyday worldly modes of 
being are not inherently fallen but display a tendency toward inauthenticity.  
She resists a decisionistic interpretation of Heidegger’s ethics by pointing to 
the significance of receptivity, passive activity and the middle voice for 
Heidegger’s account of action. 
 There is much more to McMullin’s account of the human encounter of 
one another and her treatment of the extensive literature on this topic than 
can be discussed here.  It is the fullest account and best defense of Heidegger 
in this regard that I have seen.  Because the ‘social’ and ‘justice’ are themes 
of the book, a reader might expect some discussion of the political 
dimension of human life, but there is no reference to the political, no 
discussion of the significance of the hero, and no reference to the distinction 
of the social and the communal (at the cost of the ‘social’) that Heidegger 
makes toward the end of Being and Time. –Robert J. Dostal, Bryn Mawr 
College. 
 
